Elections in Germany "are usually dull affairs" but, as Germans head for the polls this weekend, "this time it's different", said Sky News commentator Adam Boulton.

The country's proportional voting system, and the decades-old agreement between the mainstream parties to work together to exclude the far-right, "usually means that there is not much change in Germany's political settlement". But the "emergence of a challenger party on the far right which is commanding significant levels" of voter support, risks throwing the mainstream "into turmoil".

How does the German electoral system work?

Around 61 million people aged 18 and over are eligible to vote in Germany's federal (general) elections. In a system known as "personalised proportional representation", each person gets two votes: one for a candidate to represent their constituency, and the second for a party's state list. The second vote determines the strength of each party in the Bundestag (the equivalent of the UK's House of Commons).

Under election law, parties must obtain a minimum of 5% of second (party) votes before it can claim representation in parliament. First introduced in 1953, this law was "intended to prevent tiny splinter parties" from getting into parliament "and fragmenting it, making it hard to form a viable majority", said DW.

Turnout in the last two elections has been just over 76%, high by the standards of other European countries.

What are the key issues?

The most populous country in the EU has been contending with "a stagnating economy, a fraught immigration debate and profound angst over the fast-deteriorating transatlantic relationship under the new Trump administration", said the Financial Times.

The ruling red-yellow-green "traffic-light" coalition between the centre-left Social Democratic Party (SPD), the Liberals (FDP) and the Greens – which collapsed in November, precipitating this election – has blamed the country's economic slowdown on the absence of cheap Russian gas and a shrinking export market. However, their main opponent Friedrich Merz, the centre-right Christian Democratic Union (CDU)'s candidate for chancellor, has said the key to jumpstarting Germany's economy lies in getting "bureaucracy under control".

The always fractious immigration debate has been turbocharged by several recent deadly attacks, including one at a Christmas market in Magdeburg and another last week in Munich, in which migrants have been identified as suspects. A move to cut migration dramatically – a "signature issue" for the far-right Alternative for Germany (AfD) - has been embraced "wholeheartedly" by Merz, in response to "growing voter concerns", said Politico.

The most heated exchanges of yesterday's final four-way election TV debate were about Ukraine. AfD co-chair Alice Weidal urged her country to remain a "neutral mediator", drawing condemnation from the mainstream party leaders, with Merz saying "we are not neutral, we are not in between. We are on Ukraine's side and, together with Ukraine, we are defending the political order that we have here."

Who is ahead in the German polls?

Merz, who emerged as the winner of TV debate, according to a flash post-broadcast poll, is on track to become Germany's next chancellor, with his CDU party slated to draw just under 30% of the vote, according to Reuters' most recent poll of polls. The parties that make up the "traffic-light" coalition have seen their support plummet, with the SDP on 15%, Greens just behind on 13%, and the (always smaller) FDP on 3%

But the big story of these elections is the strong rise of the Elon Musk-endorsed AfD, which is currently polling second at just over 21%. The AfD is currently under observation by the country's domestic intelligence agency for suspected right-wing extremism, and its emergence as a serious electoral force is "acutely sensitive because of Germany's Nazi past", said Sky News' Boulton. Despite its rising popularity, a majority of voters strongly oppose the AfD: surveys have shown that "two-thirds of Germans regard it as a threat to democracy", and 40% would like the party to be banned.

The mainstream parties have for decades maintained a "firewall" designed to keep the far right out of power, and all have ruled out going into coalition with the AfD following this election. But there will be "headaches enough for the other parties if, as expected, AfD comes a strong second", said Boulton. And, if it tops the polls on Sunday, "the assumptions underpinning German politics would be in ruins".

As Europe digested the US election result last week, three leading figures of the German government were holding crisis talks in Berlin, said The Economist. But Chancellor Olaf Scholz, Vice-Chancellor Robert Habeck and the finance minister, Christian Lindner, weren't discussing how best to respond to Donald Trump's proposed tariffs or the likely US stance on Ukraine: "they were deciding whether to blow up their fraying coalition.

Barely 12 hours later, it was all over – and how." In a "blistering speech", Scholz eviscerated Lindner, who leads the pro-business Free Democrats (FDP), for his "incomprehensible egotism" and promptly fired him. The three parties that made up the "traffic-light" coalition that took office in 2021 – Scholz's Social Democrats (SPD), the FDP and the Greens – had lost patience with each other long ago, but this was the final blow. Scholz has brought "one of the most unpopular governments in modern German history" to an "ignoble end".

Not before time, said Jan Schäfer in Bild (Berlin). Far from tackling Germany's major problems, from its stagnant economy to its failing asylum policies, the coalition "led the country into an even deeper mess" with its meddling and infighting. To be fair, the origins of the economic mess should be traced to the failure of former chancellor Angela Merkel, said Wolfgang Münchau in The Times: it was she who allowed the economy to become over-reliant on a few industries like cars and chemicals; dependent on Russia for gas; dependent on China for exports. It was she who allowed Germany to fall far behind in digital tech; it now has one of Europe's worst mobile phone networks, and many shops "still only accept cash".

The economic crisis may be of long standing, said Alexander Marguier in Cicero (Berlin), but Scholz is to blame for "the deepest political crisis since the founding of the Federal Republic". He tried to force Lindner to suspend the constitutional rules that limit the size of Germany's deficit in order to facilitate help for Ukraine, knowing Lindner wouldn't agree: then he sacked Lindner when he baulked. Scholz's lame-duck minority government will now have to soldier on until snap elections, called for early 2025.

And each of the coalition parties is likely to come a cropper in these elections, said Nette Nöstlinger on Politico (Brussels): Scholz's SPD is polling at a miserable 16%; the FDP and Greens are doing even worse. All three face growing challenges from both the hard-left populist Sahra Wagenknecht Alliance, and the far-right AfD. But it's Friedrich Merz, of the centre-right Christian Democrats (CDU), who's likely to be Germany's next chancellor, said Josef Kelnberger in Süddeutsche Zeitung (Munich). We can only hope he will rid the country of its new reputation as the "sick man of Europe", and offer real leadership at a time when the EU confronts the prospect of a second Trump presidency and a surge in support for the far-right.

Germany's coalition government has collapsed, a victim of the country's stagnant economy and infighting among the coalition partners.

Chancellor Olaf Scholz said Thursday he will "lead the country with a minority government," said The Associated Press. His coalition fell apart after he fired Christian Lindner, leader of the Free Democratic Party, as his government's finance minister. Scholz said he does not intend to call new parliamentary elections until Jan. 15 — resisting calls for immediate snap elections. "The citizens will soon have the opportunity to decide anew how to proceed," Scholz added.

Scholz's Social Democrats had previously partnered with Lindner's FDP and the Green Party to govern Germany. The coalition fell apart after Lindner released an 18-page paper calling for a "fundamental economic overhaul" to jumpstart the country's slowing economy and close the government's $2.6 trillion budget gap, reforms that would cut social service programs and pull back from Germany's climate goals, said The New York Times. Those are demands "his coalition partners are highly unlikely to accept." Without such changes, Lindner said, his party would leave the coalition. "The situation as it is now cannot continue," Lindner said.

What did the commentators say?

Europe's largest economy "has slowly but steadily sunk into crisis," said The Financial Times. Three big drivers of the economy — the automotive, chemical and engineering sectors — "are all in a slump at the same time," making it likely that the annual gross domestic product will shrink for the second year in a row. That's the "most pronounced downturn" in Germany's postwar history, said Robin Winkler, Deutsche Bank's Germany chief economist. This has left Scholz's coalition "ever more paralyzed" about how to proceed, said the Times: "Light on the horizon is hard to detect."

"Volkswagen's woes mirror Germany's," Hanna Ziady said at CNN. The company recently said it could close factories and cut thousands of jobs. "Things cannot continue as they are now," chief financial officer Arno Antlitz said to reporters. Both Volkswagen and its home country are challenged by "high labor costs, weak productivity and competition from China," Ziady said. Those factors, alongside high taxes and an aging population, will require dramatic action. But arguments among the "fractious" three-way coalition has "left the government lacking a clear vision for the country."

What next?

A coalition collapse could be "disastrous for all three coalition parties," said Reuters. SDP and the Greens have lost support since the 2021 election, and the FDP "could be ejected from parliament altogether." But the dispute involves fundamental differences: FDP wants budget cuts, while the other two parties "agree that targeted government spending is needed to stimulate the economy," Reuters said.

"Germany needs to have an honest debate with itself," Jörn Fleck, the senior director of the Atlantic Council's Europe Center, said at the think tank's blog. But it is tough to know what happens next. A "slight majority" of Germans favored early elections even before the governing coalition fell apart. There is an opportunity, Fleck said. "A fresh start might be the next best chance for Europe's former powerhouse to find its footing."

A far-right party has won a regional election in Germany for the first time since the Second World War. The Alternative for Germany (AfD) party took 32.8% of the vote in the poll in the eastern state of Thuringia on Sunday, giving it a clear win over the conservative CDU, which came second with 23.6%. In neighbouring Saxony, the CDU defeated the AfD by just 31.9% to 30.6%.

Björn Höcke, the AfD leader in Thuringia, who was fined in July for using a Nazi slogan, hailed the victory as "historic" and warned rival parties against excluding it from any coalition deals in the regional parliament. Chancellor Olaf Scholz, whose SPD party was trounced in both states, urged other parties to govern without the AfD, which he accused of "ruining our country's reputation".

The AfD was helped by events before these polls, said The Guardian: it had ruthlessly capitalised on the killing of three people, allegedly by a failed asylum seeker, in Solingen last month. Nevertheless, the results have "sent shockwaves of fear and despair across Europe".

The results have "sent shockwaves of fear and despair across Europe". It was especially humiliating for Scholz, said The Times. His governing coalition has proved "one of the weakest in the Federal Republic's history", and all three of the mismatched parties within it fared badly. The results prompted Scholz to hold urgent talks with other party leaders on how to form state governments without the AfD – and even on "how to hold together his fractious coalition".

What did the commentators say?

Normally, regional German elections wouldn't cause much of a stir in the rest of the country, let alone in the wider world, said Andrew Neil in the Daily Mail. Only six million people live in Thuringia and Saxony, about 7% of Germany's population. But the AfD's first regional election win since its creation in 2013 is a "scary development".

Why? Because unlike other European populist parties, which in recent years have "moderated their image in the pursuit of power", the AfD has grown ever more extreme, said James Crisp and James Jackson in The Daily Telegraph. And nobody typifies this shift like Höcke. A former history teacher, he has criticised Germany for dwelling on the crimes of the Holocaust; he seems to model his rhetoric on Hitler's; his young supporters call themselves the "Höcke Youth", an echo of the Hitler Youth; and members of his own party have tried to expel him for being too extreme. Yet none of that deterred voters in Thuringia, who have gifted him an extraordinary personal triumph.

This was no failure of democracy, said Katja Hoyer in The Guardian: there were lively public debates before polling day; and turnout was at a record high. But the AfD's tough message on migration, and its calls to end the war in Ukraine, appealed to voters anxious about rising energy prices, and about Germany's ailing economy.

So far, Scholz has tried to combat the AfD by echoing its hardline rhetoric, said Hanno Hauenstein in the same paper: in the wake of the Solingen terror attack, he proposed tightening border controls and stepped up deportations of asylum seekers. But that strategy isn't working. Why? Because voters in places such as Thuringia are frustrated about more than migration and war, said Christoph Hickmann in Der Spiegel. When roads and bridges are dilapidated and "every train ride is a lottery", a feeling takes hold that "nothing works anymore", and that nobody in Berlin cares. It's this sense of hopelessness that mainstream parties must address if they are to halt the AfD's rise.

Keir Starmer said he hopes that an "ambitious" UK-Germany treaty will be agreed by the end of the year.

The PM was speaking after he met with German Chancellor Olaf Scholz in Berlin this morning.

"Growth is the number one priority for my government... and building relations with our partners here in Germany and across Europe is vital to achieving it," said Starmer.

The PM said that the countries had a "shared determination to harness the power of government for the service of working people, and that's what we are doing today: a new UK-Germany treaty, a once-in-a-generation chance to deliver for working people in Britain and in Germany".

But the problem for the PM is that "it is not yet clear how much improved bilateral relations with European nations can boost the UK economy", said the BBC's diplomatic correspondent James Landale, especially when "post-Brexit rules determine how and what we trade with the EU as a whole".

What did the commentators say?

Starmer kicked off his "two-day lovebomb" of European allies by opening negotiations on the UK's biggest-ever treaty with Germany, said London Playbook.

"No matter how many times" he "protests he won't reverse Brexit, return to free movement or join a youth mobility scheme", his "friendly language will be seized on with delight in Brussels", but the "real question" is how this "charmfest" translates into hard policy.

Downing Street said the proposed treaty will be about "increased collaboration" in a number of areas from "market access", to "innovation and tech", trade "across the North Sea", and "the environment".

Starmer's officials will be "trying to secure preferential access for British businesses to the German market", focused on certifications, tenders and legal hurdles, said Geraldine Scott in The Times.

But it's unclear "how comfortable Brussels would be with Germany striking a direct agreement with Britain", given that the country still belongs to the single market.

The PM will discuss a "landmark" economic and defence accord with Scholz, said Reuters, which they hope will "bring about an unprecedented degree of bilateral military cooperation".

The Nato allies, who are Western Europe's biggest defence spenders, are keen to make an agreement ahead of a "possible scaling back of US military support for Ukraine" if Donald Trump returns to the White House.

The partnership "could resemble the Lancaster House pact between Britain and France agreed in 2010", said the news agency, with pledges to "create a joint force and share equipment and nuclear missile research centres".

Starmer is also keen to "increase joint action" on illegal migration, including furthering intelligence sharing to intercept and shut down organised immigration crime rings, wrote Albert Toth for The Independent. He is "likely to find an ally" in Scholz, who is under pressure on the issue after three people were killed in an attack by an asylum seeker last week.

What next?

Overall, Starmer's approach "represents a departure from the previous government", which "remained less open to the prospect of greater collaboration with the EU", said The Independent.

He "has few hang-ups" over "dynamic alignment with EU standards", wrote Mujtaba Rahman, managing director for Europe at Eurasia Group, in the Financial Times, nor "the level playing field or the role of the European Court of Justice in policing new agreements". Things he is "ready to consider" include a visa scheme for EU nationals aged 18 to 30 – an early priority for Brussels.

But obvious obstacles remain. Germany is keen on a mobility scheme for young Europeans to live and work in Britain, the "very thing" that the UK government ruled out last week, said London Playbook.

An EU source told The Times that Starmer needs to realise "that any access to the EU's single market comes with obligations on mobility and alignment with European laws, on food safety for example".

From Berlin, Starmer will head to Paris for the Paralympics opening ceremony this evening, before meeting Emmanuel Macron and French business leaders tomorrow.

"Olaf Scholz and Emmanuel Macron have never liked each other," said Isabelle Lasserre in Le Figaro (Paris). They've nothing in common. Germany's chancellor is an "austere Protestant" of the traditional Left, and was raised in the "pacifist tradition". 

France's president is a "spontaneous disruptor" who leads the EU's only nuclear state and isn't afraid to make his views heard. The pair have clashed on subjects from the economy to defence to energy policy ever since Scholz came to power in 2021; but until now, they've almost always found ways to overcome crises and present a united front for Europe's common good.

Macron the 'warmonger'

No longer, said Stefan Meister in Le Monde (Paris). In recent months, the two have been embroiled in an increasingly acrimonious public dispute, the catalyst for which has been their conflicting views on managing the war in Ukraine. Berlin views Macron as a loose cannon who acts without consulting EU allies: it took particular umbrage at his suggestion that Nato ground troops be deployed to Ukraine. Paris, for its part, is frustrated by Scholz's refusal to send Taurus missiles to Kyiv for fear of provoking Putin, viewing it as typical of his habit of doing "too little, too late".

Yet it's an entirely bogus charge: the reality is that Germany is the "second-largest supplier of arms to Ukraine", behind only the US. France lags behind in 14th place. Maybe, but Scholz was wrong to portray Macron as a "warmonger", said Michaela Wiegel in Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung. You only have to look at his record in the Sahel, where he has cut back France's military presence. But Macron rightly views Putin as an existential threat to Europe, and wants to deter him from further aggression.

'A Europe that protects'

The fundamental cause of this fallout lies across the Atlantic, said Clea Caulcutt and Hans von der Burchard on Politico (Brussels): "Germany still looks to the US for security leadership in Europe, France entertains visions of a 'Europe that protects'." But this is a dispute that will become meaningless if Donald Trump is re-elected in November. Should that occur, Europe faces a very real danger of having to counter Putin's aggression without US support.

No wonder Poland's PM Donald Tusk felt it essential to hold talks with both leaders last week in a bid to revive the Weimar Triangle, an until-recently dormant alliance between the three nations. Macron and Scholz must bury their differences, agreed Christopher Ziedler in Der Tagesspiegel (Berlin). There has rarely been a more crucial time for European powers to speak with one voice, and this childish spat cannot be allowed to overshadow the EU summit due to begin in Brussels this week. If it does, you can be sure that champagne corks will be "popping in the Kremlin".

"Olaf Scholz is getting desperate," said Matthew Karnitschnig on Politico (Brussels). The financial pressures and public upset caused by the rising tide of asylum seekers is making his coalition government increasingly unpopular. 

Germany is already home to three million refugees – Ukrainians included; and this year has already seen a 70% rise in asylum applications, and there are still two months to go. So Scholz found himself hammering out a deal last week with Germany's 16 state governors aimed at curbing the numbers. 

"I don't want to use big words," the famously subdued chancellor said afterwards, "but I think this is a historic moment." He may well be right, but only because this hugely underwhelming agreement could well mark "the beginning of his political end". Its array of "cosmetic measures" includes a plan to ensure that new arrivals wait three years before receiving welfare payments; an increase in federal aid for state governments; and ambitious (but unattainable) targets to speed up deportations. But the radical steps needed to have any chance of reducing numbers? These are entirely missing.

'Problem isn't as dire as people make out'

The agreement may be imperfect, said Daniel Friedrich Sturm in Der Tagesspiegel (Berlin), but at least it shows Scholz's centre-left coalition has finally grasped the urgency of the issue, and is willing to work with its opponents in states run by centre-right Christian Democrats to address it. In any case, the problem isn't as dire as people make out, said Gesine Schwan in Süddeutsche Zeitung (Munich). Even if asylum applications hit 350,000 this year, that's still less than half the 745,545 applications submitted in 2016. The impression of being overwhelmed is due to the one-off influx of a million Ukrainians last year, all admitted without the need to apply for asylum.

Maybe so, said Cécile Boutelet in Le Monde (Paris), but the recent rise in numbers is still a hugely divisive issue: 73% of Germans say they're dismayed at the government's handling of it; one in five say they may vote for the hard-right Alternative for Germany (AfD) party, which is enjoying a surge of support. That's why last week's deal included a provision to at least consider a radical "course correction" in policy, said Oliver Maksan in Neue Zürcher Zeitung (Zurich). Until now, the idea of relocating asylum procedures abroad has been off limits for Germany. In EU Council negotiations in June, for example, Scholz's government had insisted a "connection criterion" must apply to any asylum seekers being sent to a third country – it had to be a country they already had some connection with. In now calling for an inquiry into the merits of "extraterritorial asylum centres", the government is "jumping over its own shadow".

'All credit to Meloni for grasping the nettle'

Yet that's the way the wind is blowing, said Benjamin Fox on Euractiv (Brussels). Austria has linked up with Britain in a plan to fly asylum seekers to Kigali for their claims to get processed (though unlike Britain, they won't then have to stay in Rwanda if their application is successful). Denmark is working on setting up an asylum processing centre in a central African nation; and most striking of all, Italy struck a deal last week to build two offshore holding centres for migrants in Albania. The agreement between Italy's PM Giorgia Meloni and Albania's Edi Rama came "like a bolt from the blue", said Alessandro Sallusti in Il Giornale (Milan). It's a win-win deal. Albania needs Rome's support in its push to join the EU, Italy urgently needs a radical solution to managing the migratory flows across the Mediterranean. All credit to Meloni for grasping the nettle.

On the contrary, the deal is a mirage, said Andrea Bonanni in La Repubblica (Rome). The 36,000 people a year rescued from the Mediterranean who'll be sent to the centres in Albania financed and managed by Italy can't stay there indefinitely: if denied asylum, they'll simply make their way back to Italy via Croatia. This deal, and others like it, won't solve the difficulties encountered in trying to repatriate such people. Don't be fooled: "the Albanian patch won't be able to cover the Italian hole".

Eighteen months ago, the far-right Alternative for Germany (AfD) party looked destined to fade into political "insignificance" in west Germany, said Maria Fiedler in Der Spiegel (Hamburg). 

Rocked by an acrimonious power struggle, it then suffered losses in regional elections in the western states of Schleswig-Holstein and North Rhine-Westphalia. Many concluded it was "turning into a purely eastern German party", destined never to make gains outside its heartlands in the de-industrialised former eastern bloc. 

How wrong they've turned out to be. The party has surged up the rankings in national opinion polls and last week secured "record-breaking" results in two key state elections. In Hesse, home to the financial hub of Frankfurt, it won 18.4% of the vote, second only to the conservative Christian Democratic Union (CDU); and in Bavaria, it took third place with 14.6%. The results didn't just confirm the AfD as a mainstream national party in Germany; they left its co-leader Alice Weidel "dreaming of participating in the federal government in 2025".

Immigration crisis pushing voters rightwards

As well she might, said Alexander Marguier in Cicero (Berlin). These elections were a referendum on Chancellor Olaf Scholz's governing coalition, made up of his centre-left Social Democrats (SPD), the Greens and the liberal Free Democrats (FDP). The cost-of-living crisis and the proposed ban on new gas boilers have provoked huge discontent: the results were a resounding "vote of no confidence".

The big question is why voters have turned to the hardline AfD instead of the centre-right CDU, said Jim-Bob Nickschas in Tagesschau (Berlin), and the main reason is the immigration crisis. Germany has received 244,000 asylum applications already this year, and that's not counting the million or so refugees it has taken in from Ukraine. The AfD's hard line on immigration and its opposition to arming Ukraine has been the key to its success.

A new German political epoch

Mainstream politicians are still dismissing the AfD as an undemocratic "protest" party, said Alexander Kissler in Neue Zürcher Zeitung (Zurich). But the truth is that voters are starting to see it as a viable alternative. Look how it's increasingly attracting left-wingers and the under-30s.

Indeed, the results of these elections suggest something profound has changed in Germany, said Mark Schieritz in Die Zeit (Hamburg). Owing to its troubled history, Germany's postwar politicians have been at pains to avoid scapegoating migrants, and its voters have mainly rejected the far-right. But the AfD's success in the west suggests that this "postwar consensus" has been shattered: Germany is entering a new political "epoch".

AfD's onward march set to continue

In the short term, Scholz's coalition may benefit from the AfD's surge in popularity, said The Economist. Its members quarrel incessantly; but as all three parties are getting "pasted at the polls", none will now risk collapsing the coalition. Even so, the AfD's onward march looks set to continue, said the FT. With its national polling average close to 22%, it will probably "trounce the opposition" next year in regional elections in three eastern German states – Brandenburg, Saxony and Thuringia.

Other parties now face the dilemma of whether or not to work with the AfD at the local level, in the hope of stripping the party of its outsider status and exposing its empty promises. That would be a mistake. There's no way to "normalise" these "slavishly pro-Kremlin" hardliners who pedal antisemitic, xenophobic tropes. The SPD and its allies should focus on addressing the problems that are attracting voters to the AfD in the first place.

Which is just what they're trying to do, said Nicolas Richter in Süddeutsche Zeitung (Munich): last week, for instance, the interior minister, Nancy Faeser, presented a draft bill aimed at making deportations of irregular migrants easier and faster. But that's just it, said Mark Schieritz: everyone agrees those refused asylum should be deported. But where? You can't just take people back on a plane; a plane needs permission to land and countries of origin often don't want to give it. The awful truth is that solving problems is no longer so important in politics: too many people just want to make political capital out of them.

Rishi Sunak is pushing Germany to approve the sale of Europe's most advanced fighter jets to Saudi Arabia, ahead of an expected autumn visit to Downing Street by the oil-rich country's Crown Prince Mohammed Bin Salman.

Germany banned the sale of all weapons to the Middle Eastern country after Saudi agents killed Jamal Khashoggi, a journalist and critic of Bin Salman, in June 2017. It softened its position slightly in July this year but remained stubbornly opposed to selling Typhoons to Riyadh.

Sunak is now urging Olaf Scholz, the German chancellor, to lift the ban to allow the sale of 48 Typhoon jets to Saudi Arabia, which would be worth at least £5 billion.

Eurofighter Typhoon jets are built and maintained by BAE Systems, employing several thousand people in Lancashire. 

Germany holds a veto power over the plane's sale, given it was one of four countries – alongside Britain, Italy and Spain – that developed the jet under Nato's watch in the 1980s. Currently, a third of the components for the jets come from Germany.

What did the papers say?

Scholz is believed to be in favour of approving the fighter jets deal and "is sympathetic to Britain's economic arguments", said The Telegraph. However, the German Greens Party, with whom Scholz's Social Democrats are in a coalition, "oppose it because of Saudi Arabia's human rights record", the paper said.

Britain has also argued that Germany cannot block the export of Typhoons to Saudi Arabia since its rapprochement with Iran, which could end the rival nations' proxy war in Yemen. The original deal to sell 48 fighter jets to Riyadh was put on hold due to the war in Yemen, where Saudi-led Arab forces intervened in 2015. 

Despite the delay, BAE Systems remains confident that the deal will go through. One BAE source told The Telegraph that there appeared to be "movement" on Germany's position in the past year.

The source told the paper that the motivation for the sale ought not to be purely financial, but also strategic. 

"From a geopolitical point of view, it's better [Saudi Arabia] align with the West and Western kit than our adversaries," the source added. "That's of high strategic importance. It's not just about money."

Yet for those who oppose the sale, including most of the Green Party, the embargo has both strategic as well as moral dimensions: Russia's war in Ukraine shows that one's tentative partners can easily become adversaries.

What next?

"Much is riding" on the outcome of Sunak's entreaties to the Germany chancellor on delivering Eurofighter Typhoon jets to Saudi Arabia, said The Times. 

The implications of Berlin's decision will "go beyond the order for 48 combat aircraft", the paper added, "potentially influencing the future of the British defence industry and the readiness of Germany's allies to work with it on several sensitive next-generation weapons projects".

As well as securing 5,000 jobs and more than a billion pounds of investment at BAE Systems, Britain is also keen to bring Saudi Arabia into the new Tempest programme, a joint initiative between the UK, Italy and Japan to develop an advanced new stealth fighter jet by 2035.

Germany's coalition government "remains at odds" over whether to bow to British pressure, Reuters reported, citing anonymous sources that spoke to Welt Am Sonntag. Weapon exports to conflict regions remain "a particularly sensitive issue for the Greens", Politico said.

According to The Times, however, Scholz and other senior politicians in his coalition are "acutely aware" that being willing to negotiate on such matters is "precisely what some of their allies expect as the price of Germany's credibility and reliability as a military ally".

Relations between Germany’s ruling parties plunged to a new low yesterday after the liberals reneged on previously agreed climate legislation, testing the unity of the country’s coalition government.

Tensions flared after the Green party accused the liberal Free Democrats (FDP) of “breaking their word” on a bill to ban gas boilers in new houses from next year.

According to the Financial Times, a “clearly furious” Robert Habeck, the Green vice-chancellor and economy minister, said that the ruling parties had agreed to pass the law on boilers before the summer break.

The row between the two parties now “threatens to throw a spanner in the works of Scholz’s legislative agenda”, the FT said, as the Greens threatened to respond in kind by blocking legislation put up by the FDP.

What is the gas boiler problem?

The political situation in Germany is “heating up”, said Politico’s Brussels Playbook. To reach its climate goals, Berlin had been “planning a law that will effectively ban installing or replacing new gas or petroleum-powered heating in homes, and instead will make electrical heat pumps the norm”, the site explained.

In 2020, German buildings emitted 112 million tonnes of carbon dioxide equivalent. The goal is to achieve 67 million tonnes by 2030 to meet climate targets.

Experts say transitioning to renewable energy sources like heat pumps is crucial to achieving substantial emission reductions. However, the FDP reneging on its support of the Greens’ latest bill throws the country’s plan to go carbon-neutral by 2045 into jeopardy.

Are there deeper issues with the coalition?

Angela Merkel’s long reign as Germany’s chancellor was “always going to be a hard act to follow”, said The Economist.

But her “triumphant exit” is not the sole cause of the current government’s malaise. Germans had “dubbed the wobbly-looking coalition die Ampel, the traffic-light”, the magazine said, referring to the colours of its parties: red Social Democrats, yellow Free Democrats, and the Greens. “Yet it also hinted at mixed signals and policy jams.”

The FDP’s latest move comes after the party vowed to assert itself more strongly following a drubbing in a state election last October. The party received a paltry 5% of the vote in Lower Saxony, failing to meet the threshold to enter parliament.

At the time the “pro-business, fiscally hawkish” party, which had suffered a sequence of bad election results, “blamed in part its participation in the national administration”, Reuters said.

“The FDP’s voice must become more pronounced in this coalition,” General Secretary Bijan Djir-Sarai said after the Lower Saxony result. “We must prevent left-wing projects being implemented in this coalition.”

Experts say that the FDP’s options are somewhat limited. The party cannot afford to leave the coalition, said Frank Decker, a political scientist at the Rheinisch Friedrichs Wilhelms University in Bonn.

“If the FDP were to leave this coalition, it would go under at the next elections,” he said.

According to Philipp Koeker, a political scientist at the University of Hanover, the party would do better by asserting itself positively with policy initiatives of its own rather than just blocking those of their coalition partners.

What will happen next?

After the Greens’ bill was blocked yesterday, Friedrich Merz, the leader of the opposition Christian Democrats, spoke of a “lack of leadership and chaos in the [Social Democrat]-led government”.

Yet all is not lost for the “traffic-light” coalition, said The Economist. “Not only has the Ampel steered Europe’s richest, most populous country through a crisis as challenging as any that faced Mrs Merkel. It has also set Germany – so far gingerly rather than firmly, it is true – on a course towards potentially far-reaching reform,” the magazine said.

And far from showing a lack of leadership, as the opposition suggested, Scholz is proving surprisingly effective in leading a coalition composed of disparate parts, according to Jana Puglierin of the European Council on Foreign Relations think-tank.

“Scholz has the coalition quite well in his grip,” Puglierin told the Economist. “He’s made it clear that he is the one calling the shots.”

Germany has agreed to send 14 tanks to Ukraine following months of hesitancy that has drawn attention to Nato divisions over the extent of the alliance’s involvement in the war.

Kyiv hopes that the delivery of Germany’s sought-after Leopard 2 battle tanks will be a “game-changer on the battlefield” and that the US will follow suit, said the BBC. But Berlin has been mired in lengthy “political debate” about whether the tanks would “escalate the conflict and make Nato a direct party to the war with Russia”.

And more widespread wrangling over the response to the Ukraine invasion has “exposed vulnerabilities in Western defence”, argued Tobias Ellwood, chair of the UK’s Defence Select Committee.

Why did Germany take so long?

A German government spokesperson confirmed today that the country would send the Leopard 2 tanks and permit their re-exports by partner nations. Washington is also expected to announce plans to send at least 30 M1 Abrams tanks.

Kyiv has been “pleading for months” for Western nations to send tanks that could give its forces the “firepower and mobility” to break through Russian defensive lines and recapture occupied territory, said Sky News.

The delay, said The Telegraph, “exposed a major rift in Germany’s ruling coalition” and “stoked concerns that Berlin is sabotaging Ukraine’s chances of victory”.

In an article for the same newspaper, Ellwood and retired Colonel Hamish de Bretton-Gordon said Germany risked “permanently damaging their reputation amongst Nato members”. There was also “a worrying absence of international leadership as to how we collectively respond”, the duo added.

Is arming Ukraine a risky strategy?

Germany’s position has “reignited debate within Nato about arming the embattled government in Kyiv”, said Matthew Sussex, an associate professor at the Australian National University, on The Conversation.

“Is it an obligation or a risky move? What types of weapons should be provided? And what might be the repercussions in terms of a potential response from Russia, the future of European security and, ultimately, the credibility of the West?”

Germany is already a huge donor to Ukraine’s war effort. The economic powerhouse has given Ukraine more military aid than any other countries apart from the US and UK. But Berlin’s initial refusal to send heavy battle tanks “opened the first serious crack in what had been Nato’s solid front”, said The Washington Post, and gave Vladimir Putin an opportunity for exploitation “not only on the battlefield but also in the parallel conflict zone of European public opinion”.

Support within Germany is reportedly split almost equally on whether sending German-made battle tanks to Ukraine is a good idea.

But according to The New York Times, many suspect that the key issue for German Chancellor Olaf Scholz “is that he does not believe the world is ready to see German tanks near the borders of Russia, a reminder of the Nazi invasion” in the Second World War.

What does Western division mean for the war?

Germany’s prior hesitancy to provide tanks had also prevented allies with Leopards in their arsenals from sending them to Ukraine. These allies include Poland, Denmark and Finland, whose German-made munitions included right-of-refusal clauses in the sales contracts.

President Volodymyr Zelenskyy has “every right to feel abandoned”, said Ellwood and de Bretton-Gordon in The Telegraph. Since the war began, the West’s support has proved “at best, half-hearted”.

Such equivocation “condemns both Ukraine and ourselves to a dragged out conflict, a potential stalemate and, at worst, a strategic defeat”, the pair added.

In an interview with The Observer last year, Ukrainian politician Lesia Vasylenko said she feared that Moscow would be able to “wear out the international attention towards Ukraine” with a war of attrition. Russia could “push the world into some sort of peace agreement” under which great swathes of Ukraine was partitioned, she warned.

German-made tanks could be key to turning the tide of the war in Ukraine, and Germany is under growing pressure to provide them amid fears of a new Russian offensive.

Germany, which has enjoyed decades of close economic ties with Russia, has so far been hesitant to provide Ukraine with its Leopard 2 tanks, and to approve the donation of German-made tanks from other allied nations.

‘Window of opportunity’

Western officials believe there is an impending “window of opportunity” in which Ukraine may be able to push Russian forces back, said the BBC, and that Moscow is “running short of ammunition and trained troops” despite efforts to mobilise additional forces.

Many believe that Germany’s Leopard tanks could be “key” to forcing back Russian forces. They are in “more plentiful supply” than British tanks and are operated by “more than a dozen other nations”, added the broadcaster.

Allies such as Poland and Finland are keen to provide Ukraine with their own German-made Leopard tanks – but Germany must give them permission to export the tanks, which it has yet to do.

Defence officials from more than 50 countries gathered at the Ramstein air base in southern Germany today, a day after several allied nations pledged more equipment to Ukraine to fend off further Russian offensives. Ukrainian president Volodymr Zelenskyy made a direct appeal for tanks at the talks, telling ministers at the airbase that “hundreds of thank yous are not hundreds of tanks”.

‘Long-standing German reticence’

“Germany’s long-standing reticence to wade into foreign conflicts” is in part due to “norms and policies built on guilt over World War II”, said The Washington Post. It is “anxious to avoid being seen as militarily aggressive in the decades since” the Second World War and has therefore “largely shied away from exporting weapons into conflict zones”.

For these reasons, it is sometimes described as a “pacifist” nation in security and foreign policy circles, added the paper.

Others, however, argue that Germany’s approach to international conflict is less to do with a “principled aversion to war” and is instead dependent on a “deep-seated preference for diplomacy and the idea of pushing change through economic ties”.

Germany’s historic ties with Russia have meant that the war in Ukraine has put the country in a difficult position, it added. Former German chancellor Angela Merkel, who hails from East Berlin and is fluent in Russian, played a key role in brokering a ceasefire agreement with Russia in the contested region of Donbas in 2014. But her tenure also “deepened Germany’s dependence” on Russian fossil fuels.

But it is not simply Germany’s “conscience” that is driving its foreign policy, writes Politico’s European correspondent Matthew Karnitschnig – it is its corporations. He adds that while Germany may “hang back” from supporting Ukraine in its fight to “defend its democracy from invasion by a tyrant”, it seems to have “no qualms” over selling weapons to authoritarian regimes in the Middle East such as Egypt and Qatar.

“Berlin is still holding out hope that Ukraine can somehow patch things up with Russia so that Germany can resume business as usual and switch the gas back on,” Karnitschnig argues. And even if Germany does eventually agree to send tanks to Ukraine, it is likely to “deliver as few as it can get away with and only after exhausting every possible option to delay”.

‘Tanks for tanks’ deal with US

Despite increasing international and domestic pressure, reports suggest that Chancellor Olaf Scholz will only agree to send tanks to Ukraine if the US also agrees to supply its M1 Abrams tanks – “something the Pentagon has said for months it has no intention of doing given the logistical costs of maintaining them”, said CNN.

The UK, Poland, Finland and the Baltic states have all pushed for Nato members to provide heavier equipment to Kyiv “amid what they believe is a key inflection point in the war”, said the broadcaster.

But to date only the UK has agreed to provide heavy weaponry in the form of tanks. It is set to send 14 of its Challenger 2 tanks, although other countries including Germany, France and the US have sent or pledged other armoured vehicles and air defence systems.

British tanks could be supplied to Ukraine for the first time since the Russian invasion began almost a year ago as part of a major change in Western policy aimed at bringing a military breakthrough to end the war.

According to a “Western source with knowledge of the conversations” reported by Sky News, “discussions have been taking place ‘for a few weeks’ about delivering a number of the British Army’s Challenger 2 main battle tank to the Ukrainian armed forces”.

Last week Emmanuel Macron announced that France would become the first country to heed Kyiv’s repeated calls for Western-made tanks by supplying its lightweight armoured combat vehicle. This was quickly followed by similar pledges from Germany and the US to help Ukrainian soldiers be transported at rapid speeds across the frontlines and provide additional fire support for advancing troops.

What did the papers say?

“First, the caveats,” said The Telegraph. The armoured vehicles promised by France, Germany and the US “are not, technically speaking, true tanks. They lack the armour or firepower to play the breakthrough role of those machines.”

The paper added that Germany was “still ignoring Ukrainian demands” to release its Leopard II Nato-standard battle tank “which some think would turn the tide of the war”.

In Germany, President Olaf Scholz “had been the target of heckling – even from his own coalition partners – for taking his time on deciding to send tanks to Ukraine”, reported France24.

With Poland and Finland ready to send Leopard II tanks to aid Kyiv, were the UK to carry through on reports it is preparing to send its Challenger 2 tank, then “such a move would mark a significant step-up in Western support to Ukraine and could help prompt other NATO allies, in particular Germany, to follow suit”, said Sky News.

Even without the heavy tank deployment, “this week marks a turning point in Western policy”, said The Telegraph. The question now is whether it will make a difference on the battlefield.

What next?

“The vehicles don’t fulfill Ukraine’s request for combat tanks,” said AP, but looking ahead to a likely spring offensive, they do “provide a strategic war-fighting capability as the season change brings muddy terrain and Ukraine launches an aggressive campaign to recoup territory taken by Russia, particularly in the east”.

Likewise, the deployment of Challenger 2 tanks in itself would not be a “game changer”, said Sky News. It reported that “as many as ten of the vehicles - enough to equip a squadron - could be on the table”, but the UK Defence Journal noted that this is “only a tiny portion of the 300 tanks that Ukraine is hoping to get as they try to beef up their mechanised forces”.

Retired RAF Air-Vice Marshal Sean Bell told Sky there was also the “downside” of the “massive training burden”.

The Challengers are “packed full of electronics, laser sighting, night vision goggles, targeting computers, all of which will be double Dutch to the Ukrainians”, he said.

The move would still be “hugely significant”, argued Sky, because it would “breach a barrier that has so far prevented allies from offering up Western tanks to Ukraine for fear of being seen as overly escalatory by Russia”.

With both Ukrainian and Russian forces predominantly relying on Soviet-era tanks like the T-72, Colonel Hamish de Bretton Gordon, a former commander of 1st Royal Tank Regiment, said the introduction of modern Western tanks could “tip the balance” on the battlefield in Ukraine’s favour.

“Strategically this sends a very firm message to [Russia’s President Vladimir] Putin that nothing is off the table,” he said.

While the deployment of Western armoured vehicles is “a welcome but late step”, wrote John Herbst, a former US ambassador to Ukraine, for the Atlantic Council, the slow pace of supply “means that the war lasts longer than necessary and desirable”.

The Biden administration “needs to state that its clear objective is to help Ukraine make the Russian presence in Ukraine untenable. The smart way to do that is to provide Kyiv the still longer-range artillery, missiles and drones (to three hundred kilometers), tanks, and aircraft (F-16s) enabling Ukraine to sever the land bridge to Crimea and thereby force a Russian retreat from southern Ukraine, making it extremely difficult for Russia to supply its military and more in Crimea,” he said.

Much could depend on what happens in Crimea. According to Ukrainian officials and security analysts cited by the Kyiv Post, “advancing Ukrainian troops armed with precision-guided weapons, may soon be poised to strike Russian strategic air bases, submarine pens, and an atomic weapon storage site in the Black Sea peninsula – leaving Russian leader Vladimir Putin with the unpleasant choice of nuclear escalation against Nato or backing down on Crimea”.

The US-led group of around 50 nations, including the UK, that supply military assistance to Ukraine is due to hold its next meeting on 20 January, and any announcements about further support “could be made to coincide with the Contact Group gathering”, said Sky News.

Germany and France are the EU’s “two economic powerhouses”, said Hans von der Burchard and Clea Caulcutt on Politico (Brussels). Yet their respective leaders now have such an icy relationship, “they do not even dare be seen together in front of the press”.

Last week, following a “tête-à-tête” in Paris, the French president and German chancellor were scheduled to take the usual round of questions from the media. But at the last minute, in a snub to Olaf Scholz, Emmanuel Macron backed out of making an appearance. No big deal, you might say. But this was just the latest episode of a deepening row between Paris and Berlin.

Ill-feeling has partly been generated by familiar points of contention: over EU defence policy, for example, and how to deal with China. But the biggest cause of animosity is undoubtedly the $200bn energy relief package that Germany unveiled a month ago.

Germany isn’t alone in trying to shield its people from the looming energy crunch, said Charlemagne in The Economist. Before Putin’s invasion of Ukraine, the EU got around 40% of its gas imports from Russia; today that has plummeted to 7.5% and many EU states have unveiled measures to deal with the shortfall.

But while their efforts are constrained by tight budgets, Berlin’s relief package shows that such limits don’t apply to Germany. Having set a cap on the price companies and consumers must pay for gas, the German state will shoulder the bill for the gap between that cap and the actual price importers pay on the global market.

Macron enraged

This move has enraged Macron and other EU leaders: they say it exposes them to high energy prices which only Germany has the wherewithal to subsidise at an acceptable level, said Katrin Pribyl in Augsburger Allgemeine (Augsburg). And by aiding German companies in this way, they argue, Germany is also flouting EU rules on state aid. How can, say, a Spanish steelmaker now compete with a German rival whose energy bills have been so heavily reduced?

All this follows on from a summer in which Germany filled its vast gas storage facilities with liquefied natural gas (LNG), sending gas prices soaring and leaving its neighbours high and dry. This “Germany first” strategy is straight out of Donald Trump’s playbook. “So much for the constantly vaunted European solidarity.”

Most EU states still favour a coordinated price cap that might level the playing field and spread some of Germany’s financial firepower to the rest of the bloc, said Hans-Jürgen Moritz in Focus (Berlin). But Germany, along with the Netherlands, is fearful that the kind of price cap Brussels is contemplating will prompt tankers laden with LNG to sail to Asia instead, where they can get a higher price.

Far from resolved

Under pressure, Scholz in recent weeks has ended his outright opposition, but the issue is far from resolved: EU leaders have only agreed to short-term price controls while a longer-term deal is thrashed out. Germany may even try to veto any new plan at the EU summit later this month, said Suzanne Lynch on Politico. It’s “a classic EU outcome. Everyone gets a little, no one gets everything, more talking is inevitable.”

The process feels interminable. The problem countries across Europe are all facing is essentially this, said Mathias Brodkorb in Cicero (Berlin). On the one hand, they need to keep gas prices “manageable” for businesses and consumers in order to prevent “social upheaval” and the collapse of energy-intensive businesses. On the other hand, they need to see a significant reduction in gas consumption in order to avoid acute shortages. And those two goals are “mutually exclusive”: if you keep prices down, consumption inevitably goes up.

Indeed, this is just what has happened in France and Spain, which have both brought in their own caps on energy prices, albeit at a far less generous level than Germany’s. Yet the good news for Europe is that things aren’t as hopeless as they may seem, said Hans-Jürgen Moritz. The continent’s gas storage facilities are now at 94.7% capacity, which has helped bring about a 40% fall in gas prices since August. Even as EU leaders bicker, market forces may be riding to the rescue.

The German chancellor is in the spotlight as he prepares to make a high-stakes visit to China – the first time a G7 leader has visited the country since the start of the Covid pandemic.

China was Germany’s top trading partner over the last six years, “with bilateral trade reaching $245bn last year”, said Axios. Around half of German industrial firms are heavily reliant on China but there is mounting concern in the West about Beijing’s trade practices, human rights record and territorial ambitions.

Therefore Olaf Scholz’s visit, which starts tomorrow, will be “closely watched for clues on how serious Germany is about reducing its economic reliance on Asia’s rising superpower” and “confronting its Communist leadership”, said Reuters.

The trip “could send a confusing signal about how Europe’s largest economy plans to deal with Beijing”, said Axios, especially as other EU countries “increasingly toughen their stances on China”.

Andrew Small, from the German Marshall Fund, told Axios that Scholz is “specifically trying to maintain a certain traditional framework and economic ties” with Beijing, “in the teeth of pretty sweeping opposition from… the public, most of his coalition and increasingly other parts of Europe as well”.

Meanwhile, Scholz is trying to present a determined and robust front. “We don’t want to decouple from China”, he wrote for Politico, but Berlin “can’t be overreliant”. He insisted that “we will seek cooperation where it lies in our mutual interest, but we will not ignore controversies either”.

Last December, Scholz said that “we need to base our China policy on the China we find in reality”, and vowed to pursue “German and European interests” with “great self-confidence”.

But Thorsten Benner, co-founder and director of the Global Public Policy Institute in Berlin, argued on Foreign Policy that he “shows very little of this realism and self-confidence” as he prepares for the visit.

In September 2021, as Germany went to the polls to elect a successor to Angela Merkel, the prospect of a candidate proposing a €100bn (£83bn) increase in defence spending seemed unthinkable.

But two months and one Russian invasion of Ukraine later, new Chancellor Olaf Scholz announced that he was giving the green light for a massive injection into the nation’s defence budget, while describing the conflict as a “zeitenwende” (“watershed moment”) for Europe.

Vladimir Putin’s unprovoked assault has prompted a sea change in German foreign policy and overturned almost a century of national consensus. So where does Berlin now stand on the conflict – and has it truly triggered a “zeitenwende”?

‘Dawn of the deterrence era’

While Germany is not alone in funnelling more funding towards defence in light of Putin’s war, Berlin’s “turnabout is the most dramatic”, The New York Times said.

Scholz, the leader of the centre-left Social Democratic Party (SPD) who was previously Merkel’s deputy, has committed to spending above 2% of the country’s economic output on defence, “a level not reached in more than three decades”.

The chancellor also pledged “an immediate injection” of €100bn (£83bn) into the nation’s “notoriously threadbare armed forces”. In his speech, he told German lawmakers: “We need planes that fly, ships that sail and soldiers who are optimally equipped”.

Such a sudden increase in funding “is a watershed moment” for Germany, a country that has for decades “sought to leave behind an aggressive military stance that contributed to two devastating world wars”, the paper added.

Mapped onto Germany’s 20th-century history, Scholz’s sea-change marks a “seismic shift from post-war pacifism”, the i news site said.

A “beacon of stability and prosperity” within the European order since the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, the spending injection suggested Berlin recognised the need to “adapt quickly to a new world shaped by Russia’s aggression”.

Germany had “initially refused to send arms to Ukraine as Russian troops massed ahead of the 24 February invasion”, the site reported. Instead, it offered helmets, prompting Kyiv Mayor Vitali Klitschko to ask: “What will they send next? Pillows?”

Once the invasion began, however, “a swift rethink and a decision to send defensive weapons such as anti-tank missiles” meant “change came fast”, the site added.

Russia’s invasion has ushered in “the dawn of the deterrence era” in German politics, said Rachel Tausendfreund, editorial director of the Washington-based German Marshall Fund think tank.

The “shock” of Putin’s war has “turned the geopolitical times for Germany”, she explained, continuing that prior to the invasion, Berlin was “unique in the West for having a strategic logic still shaped primarily by the lessons of the First World War”.

This meant that “the logic of military deterrence” that “formed the backbone of Western military posture since the Second World War never penetrated beyond small foreign-policy circles and the centre-right in Germany”.

But in the midst of a war on European soil “the logic of deterrence” is gaining “currency across the mainstream party spectrum in Germany”, she added. And this means “the path to a completely different European security order could be open”.

Too little, too late?

While the shift in German foreign policy has been widely welcomed by its European and Nato allies, critics have suggested that it will take more than €100bn “to restore the country’s rusting armed forces to their former strength”, The Telegraph said.

Scholz’s spending injection is a “momentous announcement for a country that has long been synonymous with underfunding its military”. But it comes at a time when “Germany, Europe’s biggest economy, has a smaller military to that of Ukraine”.

Berlin “relies entirely on Nato for its defence”, the paper added. “Without the alliance it would be there for the taking.”

Germany has long been considered Europe’s “most notorious defence free rider”, The Wall Street Journal said, prompting criticism by former US president Donald Trump who repeatedly called for Berlin to increase its defence budget. And even now, post-zeitenwende, Scholz is causing divisions in the West’s response.

He was yesterday forced to defend “his decision not to export heavy weapons to Ukraine”, the Financial Times reported, claiming that “Berlin’s closest allies had also concluded that supplying such arms at the present time made little sense”.

His intervention came amid “mounting domestic pressure to supply tanks and armoured personnel carriers” to Kyiv, the paper added, which is “bracing for a big Russian offensive in the eastern border region of Donbas”.

According to Der Spiegel, Scholz is “coming under increasing pressure for his restrained Ukraine policies” in Brussels and Berlin. And “he has massive public support” for boosting defence spending and making Germany a more muscular force, The Telegraph said.

“A recent poll found 76% of Germans back his move to rearm,” the paper added. What remains to be seen is “whether all this enthusiasm can translate into real action”.

Key NATO allies spoke up this weekend to distance themselves from what many interpreted as President Biden's call for regime change in Russia.

During a speech in Warsaw, Poland, on Saturday, Biden said of Russian President Vladimir Putin, "For God's sake, this man cannot remain in power."

The White House quickly walked back the ad-libbed statement, claiming that Biden's "point was that Putin cannot be allowed to exercise power over his neighbors or the region" and that Biden "was not discussing Putin's power in Russia or regime change."

French President Emmanuel Macron, who speaks frequently with Putin, said Saturday that Biden had spoken too forcefully, The Wall Street Journal reported. "I wouldn't use this type of wording because I continue to hold discussions with President Putin," Macron said, adding that "the objective" is "to stop the war," not to depose Putin.

German Chancellor Olaf Scholz also weighed in during a Sunday appearance on German television. Regime change "is not the aim of NATO, and also not that of the American president," Scholz said. "We both agree completely that regime change is not an object and aim of policy that we pursue together."

In the United Kingdom, cabinet minister Nadhim Zahawi said Sunday that it is up to "the Russian people to decide how they are governed," The Guardian reported.

"The Russian people, I think, are pretty fed up ... I think the Russian people will decide the fate of Putin and his cronies," added Zahawi, the U.K.'s education secretary.

Images of Vladimir Putin facing down Western leaders from the opposite end of a 20ft-long table have made front pages worldwide amid the diplomatic push to stem tensions over Ukraine.

But while many commentators speculated the the Russian president was giving his guests a frosty reception, the socially distanced set-up was actually the result of a separate tiff over Covid-19 safety measures.

Emmanuel Macron and Olaf Scholz both refused to take PCR tests on their arrival at the Kremlin, with a source in the French president’s entourage telling Reuters that “we could not accept that they get their hands on the president’s DNA”.

Thanks but no thanks

“If knowledge is power, knowing the intimate secrets of one's DNA could be a powerful weapon,” said The Independent. And that may explain why Macron and Scholz both “seemed to balk at Russian-administered coronavirus tests”.

Two sources who travelled to Moscow with Macron for the meeting last week told Sky News that the French president was offered the choice of taking a Russian PCR test or keeping his distance from Putin.

The insiders said that Macron opted for the second choice, instead taking a PCR test administered by his personal doctor in France prior to his departure and on his return. “We knew very well that meant no handshake and that long table,” one of the sources said.

Putin’s spokesperson confirmed to reporters that Macron turned down the offer of a Kremlin PCR test, but insisted: “There is no politics in this, it does not interfere with negotiations in any way.”

Days later, Germany's Chancellor Scholz “became the second European leader in a week to refuse a Russian-administered coronavirus test on his visit to the Kremlin”, The Moscow Times reported.

According to Munich-based newspaper Suddeutsche Zeitung, a German Embassy doctor in Moscow tested Scholz, with Russian authorities invited to observe the test.

Putin, who is said to have received the Russia-developed Sputnik V vaccine, has “adhered to strict health protocols since the start of the pandemic”, The Moscow Times said.

But Macron and Scholz’s concerns about PCR testing extend beyond health issues, according to insiders.

DNA concerns

Neither Macron or Scholz are “known for opposition to Covid-19 countermeasures”, The Independent reported, “so speculation arose that they were trying to keep genetic material out of Russia’s hands”.

“In the high-stakes world of national security and international espionage, global powers are always looking for an edge,” the paper continued. And some experts have suggested that “gene science may one day be a useful addition to the arsenal”.

At the moment, “this may be a case where imagination is getting a bit ahead of what science is actually capable of”. Neither of the two Western leaders directly accused the Kremlin of attempting to harvest their DNA, with Macron’s office stating that the request “did not seem to us to be either acceptable or compatible with our diary constraints”.

“The president has doctors who define with him the rules that are acceptable or not in terms of his own health protocol,” Macron’s team added.

A spokesperson for Scholz said that the chancellor had decided that “he wouldn’t be available” for a Russian PCR test, but insisted: “I wouldn’t interpret too much into that.”

All the same, possessing world leaders’ DNA could prove handy for foreign adversaries one day, according to Professor Denise Syndercombe Court, a leading authority on forensic genetics at King’s College London. “I would have refused as well,” she told The Telegraph.

Court said she would only do a Covid test “with an accredited organisation… because then you can be relatively assured they wouldn’t do anything inappropriate with the material afterwards”.

She explained that “if you’ve got a whole genome, then even if you didn’t know [Macron’s] name, you’d be able to find out who he was” and who his relatives were.

A genetic analysis might also reveal “potential weaknesses” in a rival leader’s health, noted the paper, which pointed out that “sickle cell disease, for example, is the result of just one change in your genome”.

Some experts have also voiced fears that DNA could be used by “rogue states or terrorists” to develop “a bioweapon engineered to harm or kill a specific person”.

Although that notion may seem far fetched, “the French were clearly concerned enough about it to refuse a standard Covid test in the Kremlin – and Germany was keen to follow suit”, said The Telegraph.

And that “may leave Boris Johnson with a difficult decision next time he visits Moscow”.