Can a new commander turn things around?

last updated 8 January 2015

Afghanistan

Afghans aren’t sorry to see the back of Gen. David Richards, said Herat’s Sada-ye Hariwa in an editorial. The British commander of NATO forces in Afghanistan certainly meant well. Rather than ordering his forces to bomb villages suspected of harboring Taliban fighters—a tactic that could have needlessly killed civilians—Richards chose to negotiate with village elders, allowing them to police their own regions. It was a nice idea. But it “proved to be ineffective in tackling terrorism.” Just before Richards relinquished the NATO command to his successor, U.S. Gen. Dan McNeill, the Taliban retook a key village, apparently with the elders’ permission.

Richards’ motives may not have been so benign, said Kabul’s Eqtedar-e Melli. Some analysts believe that Richards was willing to strike deals with the Taliban “in an effort to maintain ties” between Britain and Pakistan. After all, negotiating with village elders to keep out the Taliban is a policy that originated with Pakistan. The tactic was hardly one to copy: It had little success on the Pakistani side of the border. Yet the Pakistanis are planning to do it again, said Kabul’s Cheragh. Media reports there say the Pakistani government is opening negotiations with Taliban fighters holed up in the Pakistani province of North Waziristan. This is disastrous news for Afghanistan. In the months since the first peace accords were signed in Waziristan, “attacks in Afghanistan have in