It was the best of deals, it was the worst of deals.
With apologies to Charles Dickens, there's a fair chance that's how future historians will label the fledgling nuclear agreement with Iran. Under the circumstances, the deal is not so bad. But those circumstances!
It's easy to go easy on the so-called framework agreement. It's designed to produce a formal treaty this summer, and the early signs are promising. The deal could end up being a really big deal. But the deal could also amount to nothing whatsoever. In the meantime, we should carefully examine the deep relief now emanating from both sides of the bargaining table.
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For the Iranians, it's no mystery: Years of crippling sanctions will be lifted, and though the sanctions could theoretically be "snapped back” into place, experts agree that once they're gone, they're gone, thanks to the power that Russia and China can wield at the United Nations. After losing access to oil markets and watching its currency bottom out, it's little shock that Tehran got to yes.
The greater surprise is that the White House was willing to move so far from its initial bargaining position. Not only does that indicate a perceived need to abandon key negotiating terms. It also indicates a willingness to accept the political punishment that comes along with it. Many Republicans are convinced that President Obama wanted a deal regardless of what he lost to get it — not in service to any strategic imperative, or even to a deluded sense of "peace in our time," but in service to his own ego, to his sense of personal historical significance.
Others zoom out a bit and believe that Obama genuinely hopes to recast the ruins of the Mideast by putting Iran at its head. Say what you will about the Islamic Republic, but it contains a functional civilization with a vested interest in a stable regional order. However, because the Iran-led path to that future stability must plow through the destruction of the Sunni Arab-led order in shambles today — and through the security interests of Israel — the administration's critics can warn that any future dividend paid out by Iranian dominance is morally and strategically eclipsed by the clear and present calamities waiting around the bend.
To wit: Even if the framework agreement manifests in the feel-good hit of the summer, critics say, the Saudis and others will move swiftly to obtain their own access to nuclear weapons. While Israel managed such a program for decades without triggering regional proliferation, even a shadow of Arab doubt in the success of the framework agreement will trigger a rush toward the Bomb. How fast? Ask the arch proliferators in Pakistan. For them, delivering nukes to the Saudis is about as easy as lending them a cup of flour.
What could be worth that kind of trouble? Does President Obama really believe what he has intimated in public — that the alternative to his deal is war? At the risk of repeating ourselves, we should forever recall the words of George W. Bush, who let slip that the "surge" in Iraq would work "because it has to." Of all the things we can presume about the framework agreement, the most important is that the White House believes the deal is essential to America's interests and security.
Perhaps perversely, this presumption is justified by how bad the deal could be for our regional allies. Here's the logic: Right now, the United States is not adequately prepared to fight and win a full-blown war with Iran. Yet bombing alone would most likely just worsen our security situation. From that standpoint, it's in our best interest to pursue virtually any deal that gives us time to improve our military posture. That's bad news for our Arab allies, who are not in a waiting mood. Not only do they have reasons we do not to let skepticism toward the deal run free. They also stand to lose out directly from the lifting of sanctions — right at the moment when, in Yemen and elsewhere, they are locked in mortal combat with Iran's proxies and allies. Much the same goes for Israel.
Of course, Republicans suspect that President Obama would not go to war with Iran even if the military was as well-funded and well-rested as the GOP could dream. But the upshot of the framework agreement pertains to an even larger question of strategy than the use of force. Since the beginning of Obama's time in office, Republicans have accused the president of an almost adversarial relationship with our allies — belittling them, betraying them, leaving them in the lurch. This deal indicates the logic behind the administration's curious habit of putting daylight between the U.S. and its friends around the world. Not since the Suez crisis has a president so sharply distinguished American interests from those of its allies.
In this sense, the debate over the framework agreement — and all that might follow — is a debate over two rival visions of American exceptionalism. One side, dominated by Republicans, believes our unique place in the world betokens a moral and strategic imperative to stand with smaller powers outside the orbit of our biggest adversaries. The other side, dominated by Democrats, believes almost the opposite.
Throughout history, few seasoned statesmen have set out to choose between such extremes. But with a presidential election around the bend, the American people may well have to do exactly that.
