Warnings about Britain's capacity to defend itself are growing louder. Why?
What has triggered the warnings?
Even the current defence secretary, John Healey, and his predecessor, Ben Wallace, admit that Britain's Armed Forces have been "hollowed out" by years of underfunding. This has become an urgent problem since the 2022 invasion of Ukraine; until then, few thought it plausible that UK forces might soon be involved in a land war in Europe. Donald Trump's return to the White House has brought the issue into even sharper relief. His commitment to Nato is in doubt; his officials have stated that they do not see the protection of Europe as a priority, and that they resent Europe "free- loading" on US defence capabilities. This has led to a frantic re-evaluation of the continent's militaries, including Britain's.
What state are our Armed Forces in?
The British Army is forecast to fall below 70,000 this year, making it smaller than at any time since 1793. In total, UK regular forces now number about 136,000: 74,000 in the Army, 32,000 in the Royal Navy and Royal Marines, and 30,000 in the RAF. That is down from 192,000 in 2010, 321,000 in 1980, and over half a million in 1960. Britain has tried to maintain a "full spectrum" of capabilities – from aircraft carriers and submarines to fast jets and cruise missiles, from tanks to cyber operations – but has found itself stretched very thin. In the 1980s, the Army had more than 1,000 main battle tanks. It now has about 200, of which perhaps half are serviceable (for reference, Russia has lost about 3,900 in Ukraine). The RAF is short of fighter jets because it is retiring 49 Eurofighter Typhoons, nearly a third of its total fleet; it also has a shortage of trained pilots. The Royal Navy is often said to have more admirals (40) than warships (technically it has 70 surface vessels, but these include patrol boats). Although its two aircraft carriers are designed for 36 fighter jets, neither has carried more than eight because of a shortage of suitable aircraft.
What does this mean in practice?
The UK has the world's sixth-largest defence budget, and the Global Firepower Index still ranks it as the world's sixth most powerful military (below the US, Russia, China, India and South Korea, and above France and Japan). But though it has sophisticated weaponry, a hi-tech defence industry and well-trained servicemen, it faces a crisis of credibility – largely because it could not deploy a fully integrated force to fight for any length of time, or even a peacekeeping force with a serious deterrent effect. In a recent simulation of a European war, the Army ran out of ammunition in just 10 days. It would struggle to send a division (of 10,000 personnel or more) to Ukraine for any length of time. If it ever had to fight a war on the scale of Ukraine's, Veterans Minister Alistair Carns warned last year, it'd be "exhausted" (wiped out) in as little as six months. The UK also has a series of other vulnerabilities. Its missile defences are poor. Until next year at the earliest, it will be wholly dependent on others for crucial satellite intelligence.
How did it come to this?
The post-Cold War "peace dividend" saw funding heavily reduced, and diverted elsewhere. In 1956, Britain spent just under 8% of its GDP on defence. In 1980, it was 4.1%; but since 2000, the proportion has remained around the 2% mark. By contrast, the health budget was about 3% in 1956, but had hit 12% by 2020. The squeeze was especially tight during austerity: real-terms defence spending fell by 22% between 2009/10 and 2016/17, before climbing again. The aim was to create a "leaner" military, but this has left it without crucial resources. The UK's inventory of artillery and shells, depleted by donations to Ukraine, is seriously inadequate. There is also a series of further weaknesses, such as in recruitment and procurement.
What problems are there in recruitment?
Both the Army and the Navy have failed to meet recruitment targets for each of the past five years. The Army, which outsourced its recruitment to Capita, has met only 63% of its target numbers. This is partly because service morale has fallen "to record lows", says Healey. Poor housing is a major issue here. The Defence Committee found in December that accommodation for service personnel and their families was "shocking".
What about procurement?
In 2022, Labour collated figures showing that the Ministry of Defence had wasted £13 billion between 2010 and 2021, including a £1 billion overspend on four Astute-class submarines, and £4 billion on cancelled contracts – such as £595 million spent to extend the life of 1980s Warrior armoured vehicles. The troubled £5.5 billion contract for Ajax armoured vehicles, ordered in 2014, still has not been delivered. In 2022/23, more than a third of MoD contracts (worth £13 billion) were awarded without competition. That said, defence procurement presents unique challenges: much equipment must be produced domestically, for national security reasons; and big programmes can take decades, making them vulnerable to changes of government or unforeseen financial circumstances.
Will things improve?
In February, Keir Starmer announced that defence spending would rise from 2.3% of GDP currently, to 2.5% by 2027 (achieved by reducing overseas aid) to meet what he called a "generational" challenge. This will mean approximately £13 billion extra to this year's budget of around £57 billion. Although welcome, much of the money will be needed just to plug gaps – low munition stocks, ageing equipment and so on – and to deal with recruitment (a new service is being launched). At the same time, the MoD will have to contend with the revolution brought about by digital warfare, and particularly by drones. Most defence experts think much more money will be needed. The Strategic Defence Review, aided by the former Nato chief Lord Robertson, will have to make sense of all these issues. It is due within weeks.
The nuclear deterrent
Britain became the third nuclear power in 1952. Since 1969, it has had a continuous at-sea nuclear deterrent that could be launched from a submarine in the event of a strike on Britain – first in the form of Polaris and, since 1994, of Trident, a US missile system made by Lockheed Martin, though the nuclear warheads are manufactured by the Atomic Weapons Establishment at Aldermaston in Berkshire. The UK's deterrent is entrusted to four nuclear-powered Vanguard-class Royal Navy submarines, each capable of carrying 16 missiles with a range of up to 7,000 miles, which operate out of the Faslane base near Glasgow. Trident's cost has long been a cause for concern: it soaks up around 6% of the defence budget, without giving much practical war-fighting capacity. Today, its infrastructure is fraying: the Vanguards are scheduled to be replaced in the 2030s; big investment is needed at Aldermaston; Trident has reportedly not been successfully test-fired since 2012. In theory, it is "operationally independent" of the US, but it has always been dependent on US tech and political support. Trump's stance has both made the case for a UK nuclear deterrent more compelling, and raised questions about the reliability of the current system.
