The tiny Arab nation is buying friends and influence in Washington. What does it want?
What is Qatar doing in the U.S.?
It’s showering money and gifts on key political players, last month presenting President Trump with a $400 million luxury Boeing 747 that could eventually serve as Air Force One. Trump’s acceptance of the jet drew criticism from even staunch MAGA allies: Far-right influencer Laura Loomer called it a gift from “jihadists in suits,” alluding to Qatar’s extensive ties to Islamist groups across the Middle East. That 747 was just the most public display of a yearslong push by ultra-wealthy Qatar—the Connecticut-size nation is the world’s third-largest exporter of liquefied natural gas—to curry favor with both Republicans and Democrats. Since 2017, the emirate has spent some $225 million on lobbying and public relations efforts in Washington. Some of that cash flowed to Mercury Public Affairs when it was led by Susie Wiles, now Trump’s chief of staff, and to FBI Director Kash Patel, a former consultant for Qatar. Attorney General Pam Bondi, who signed off on the 747 gift as legal, used to work for a lobbying firm that earned $115,000 a month from Qatar. And New Jersey Democrat Bob Menendez, former chair of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, was found guilty in January of taking bribes under the expectation he’d “use his influence and power” to “benefit the government of Qatar.” But the Arab nation’s spending spree isn’t solely focused on politicians.
Where else is its money going?
To American colleges and universities, which have received at least $6.3 billion from Qatar since the U.S. government started tracking such data in 1986. That’s about $700 million more than China, the second-largest source of foreign funding for U.S. schools. Much of the money has gone to universities such as Georgetown and Cornell, which have opened satellite campuses in the Qatari capital, Doha. Qatar’s media-savvy ruling Al Thani family, which founded the globally influential Al Jazeera network, has also invested in American news outlets. One royal, Sheikh Sultan bin Jassim Al Thani, pumped $50 million into the pro-Trump Newsmax channel in 2019 and 2020. Around that time, News-max execs reportedly pushed staff to avoid covering Qatar’s shaky human rights record or its brutal treatment of migrant laborers in the run-up to the 2022 World Cup. “We were told very clearly from the top down, no touching this,” said one employee. Earlier this year, a consulting firm paid $180,000 monthly by Qatar helped facilitate a friendly interview between Qatari Prime Minister Mohammed bin Abdulrahman Al Thani and conservative commentator Tucker Carlson.
What does Qatar hope to achieve?
The country may be trying to temper criticism of its foreign policy—notably its support for Islamist groups such as the Muslim Brotherhood, various jihadist factions in Libya and Syria, and above all Hamas. Qatar sent at least $2 billion to the Palestinian terrorist group in recent years, according to a report by lawyers for the families of people killed in Hamas’ Oct. 7, 2023, attack on Israel. And until last year, key Hamas leaders were allowed to live in Doha. “Why would you welcome into your country these forces that could be potentially destabilizing?” asked Steven Cook, a Middle East expert at the Council on Foreign Relations. “I think: ‘Well, maybe they are true believers.’” Education Secretary Linda McMahon in April accused Qatar of orchestrating a “financial infiltration” of U.S. colleges to “reshape how our elite campuses teach about Israel and the Middle East.” (A week later, McMahon sat down for what she described as a “productive conversation” with Qatar’s ambassador to the U.S.) While some see Qatar as being motivated by extremism, others see its foreign policy as being driven by more pragmatic concerns.
What are those?
Qatar is phenomenally wealthy—its $526 billion sovereign wealth fund is the world’s eighth-largest—but it remains a tiny, vulnerable nation in a volatile neighborhood. Home to some 3 million people, only 300,000 of whom are native Qataris, the country shares a land border with one regional hegemon, Saudi Arabia, and sits across the Persian Gulf from another, Iran. Following Iraq’s 1990 invasion of Kuwait—another small, hydrocarbon-rich state—the Al Thani family decided their best bet for security lay in making their diminutive country a major player in world affairs, economically, politically, and culturally. Qatar ramped up natural gas exports to Europe and Japan and bolstered its security ties with the U.S. by spending $1 billion to build Al Udeid Air Base. That base, outside Doha, is now the largest U.S. military installation in the Middle East and the forward headquarters for U.S. Central Command. Qatar also boosted funding and support for Islamist groups across the Muslim world, to help the petrostate avoid “losing public support in its own region,” said Allen Fromherz, a historian specializing in the Middle East.
Has the strategy worked?
Qatar’s policy of playing both sides caused a crisis in 2017, when President Trump threw his support behind a blockade of Doha by Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Egypt, and Bahrain. Those countries demanded Qatar end its support of Muslim Brotherhood–affiliated Islamist groups that grew in popularity during the Arab Spring and were now threatening their regimes. Trump reversed his stance on the blockade the following year, but it gave the Al Thanis a taste of what life might be like without American support. Spooked, the Qataris kept a close connection with Trump world when he left office in 2021 and bolstered their charm offensive when he returned to the White House in January. For now, the president seems delighted with the Qataris’ generosity. While visiting Doha last month, Trump thanked his hosts for their “unbelievable splendor and warmth” and described Qatar as a “key diplomatic force on the world stage.”
The ‘sportswashing’ game
Images of Doha’s gleaming skyline were beamed across the planet during the 2022 World Cup, which cost Qatar an estimated $220 billion to stage. It was the culmination of a two-decade-long campaign by Emir Tamim bin Hamad Al Thani to turn his nation into a sports superpower. When Al Thani was heir apparent, he helped bring the 2006 Asian Games to Doha and, a few years later, bought top French soccer club Paris Saint-Germain for about $80 million. In 2021, Qatar joined the Formula One circuit, staging a Grand Prix race outside Doha. Once an obscure emirate, Qatar has “become a country people know, largely thanks to sport,” said political consultant Karim Sader. Human rights activists argue Qatar is engaged in “sportswashing”: using athletic spectacles to divert international attention from the autocratic regime’s human rights abuses. But Simon Chadwick, an expert on sports and geopolitics, says this focus on sports and entertainment also serves a purpose at home, helping the royal family buy the loyalty of the country’s young population. “The bargain,” Chadwick explains, “is: ‘We’ll give you [soccer stars], Formula One, rock concerts, cinema, but don’t challenge us.’”