The future of trade: U.S. rules. Or China's rules.

And you thought net neutrality was kind of boring? Well the Trans-Pacific Partnership isn’t the most scintillating of subjects, unless you’re the U.S. Trade Representative, but it might just be the most important piece of legislation that Congress will debate this year.

Don’t take Paul Krugman’s word for it, though.

He says that it’s “No Big Deal."

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Now, I’m not a Nobel laureate, I don’t teach at Princeton, and my beard is not as thick as his, so I wouldn’t even begin to question his economic analysis. It is true that the worst argument in favor of this trade agreement, or really any trade agreement, is that it will create a certain number of jobs over a certain period of time. Just no evidence to support that. It is also true that, as Krugman says, trade pacts “aren’t what they used to be” because previous worldwide agreements have eliminated a lot of the tariffs and barriers. The world isn’t so protectionist anymore. Finally, it’s true that this trade agreement is largely about “others things.” Krugman notes that the real force of the pact would be in its increased protections for the property rights (intellectual and otherwise) of U.S. companies.

But I think Krugman is missing a big “other thing.” That other thing is China.

As soon as TPP negotiations got underway, China began to speed up separate agreements with several countries that are party to the TPP. It’s part of a 16-country Regional Cooperation and Economic Partnership (RCEP) that looks to modernize and streamline the roughly 100 or so trade agreements between Asian countries. RCEP is a great agreement for its signatories, and especially for China, which holds a lot of sway over the specific rules that are adopted. That’s fine; China can do what it wants.

In the absence of a strong, U.S.-imprinted trade policy across the Pacific, China will negotiate the trade agreements on the terms most favorable to its industries and political ambitions. The U.S. will also be compelled by logic to offer terms that are more favorable to American companies and consumers, as well as terms that Asian countries would also find favorable.

Example: Chinese trade principles would force U.S. companies to disclose proprietary information before they get access to Chinese markets. If Chinese rules were adopted across the 11 countries who would be privy to the TPP, then China would acquire a hell of a lot of intellectual property at the expense of everyone else, especially the United States. China can negotiate on its terms regardless of what the U.S. does with other countries, but it will have less leverage to do so if other countries have better access, with less onerous rules, to other markets.

So TPP is really about the long-run. In the short term, generally low U.S. trade barriers and tariffs would greatly reduce the still-high Bs and Ts that other countries level on American goods. In Malaysia, Americans cars carry a 30 percent duty. Japanese cars don’t. Guess which cars are more popular now? In Vietnam, that duty sits at 70 percent. Higher American penetration of these markets will give the U.S. more economic leverage in the future. So long as there are nation-states with competing interests, the U.S. and China will compete, unless one of the powerful countries decides not to.

The specific tenets of TPP are not uncontroversial and the secrecy surrounding the negotiations can be offensive to our modern sensibilities about transparency. Republicans in Congress are more willing to give TPP an up-or-down yes or no vote, although Democrats and Republicans want verbal concessions from the administration about getting tough on Chinese currency manipulation. (Doing so might be a deal-breaker for other countries (Australia, Brunei, Canada, Chile, Japan, Malaysia, Mexico, New Zealand, Peru, Singapore and Vietnam), that must trade with China and don’t want to be chickens in the middle of that fight.) Liberals are skeptical that the labor protections that TPP includes — protections, by the way, which NAFTA held to the side, would not be enforced by Republican administrations in the future. But that’s a weird argument. It might be hard to convince Vietnam to adopt the standards proscribed from the International Labor Organization, but surely it would be harder if Vietnam had not signed a trade pact promising adherence to them.

Elizabeth Warren, who does know a thing or two about economics, says that TPP’s provision allowing companies to challenge laws that they find anti-competitive, could “gut” U.S. environmental and labor laws. The White House, POLITICO noted, was worried enough by her public criticism that they posted a response — which Warren then dismissed.

The TPP debate is a long way from over. But as you consider its merits and drawbacks, ignore the arguments from both sides about jobs. They’re the least interesting. Instead, think about the future.