Lab leaks have happened before, and probably more often than you'd think


A free daily digest of the biggest news stories of the day - and the best features from our website
Thank you for signing up to TheWeek. You will receive a verification email shortly.
There was a problem. Please refresh the page and try again.
As researchers continue to investigate the origins of COVID-19, there has been an increased focus on the lab leak theory, a once-taboo hypothesis gaining credibility in the public and scientific communities that suggests the SARS-CoV-2 virus escaped from a lab in China.
But as many perhaps wouldn't know, lab leaks have not only happened multiple times before, they've happened relatively recently, as well.
"Nearly every SARS case since the original epidemic has been due to lab leaks — six incidents in three countries, including twice in a single month from a lab in Beijing," writes Dr. Zeynep Tufekci for The New York Times.
Subscribe to The Week
Escape your echo chamber. Get the facts behind the news, plus analysis from multiple perspectives.

Sign up for The Week's Free Newsletters
From our morning news briefing to a weekly Good News Newsletter, get the best of The Week delivered directly to your inbox.
From our morning news briefing to a weekly Good News Newsletter, get the best of The Week delivered directly to your inbox.
In 2007, foot-and-mouth disease, a virus able to "devastate livestock," escaped via drainage pipe leak from a U.K. lab with the "highest biosafety rating," reports Tufekci. And don't think America hasn't made its own mistakes. In 2012, the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention reported "11 laboratory-acquired infections across six years," typically in BSL-3 labs, a biosafety rating one step down from the maximum BSL-4. "In each instance," writes Tufekci, exposure was not realized until "lab workers became infected."
To curb potential disasters, scientists have suggested stricter controls, or moving research labs outside "densely populated cities." Some have even mentioned implementing a "stronger risk-benefit analysis" before researching a pathogen that could "inadvertently spark pandemics."
Whatever the path, Tufekci calls on government officials and scientists to put "public interest before personal ambitions" and acknowledge biomedical research as a powerful, but potentially dangerous tool.
Read more at The New York Times.
Continue reading for free
We hope you're enjoying The Week's refreshingly open-minded journalism.
Subscribed to The Week? Register your account with the same email as your subscription.