Five things we learned from the Covid Inquiry report

As many as 23,000 UK deaths could have been avoided if the first lockdown had happened a week earlier, according to the findings of the Covid-19 Inquiry. The government’s response to the deadly virus was “too little, too late”.

The 760-page report of the second part of the inquiry’s hearings makes for “grim reading for the country’s former prime minister, and much of his top team”, said Andrew McDonald in Politico. “Boris Johnson, look away now.”

‘Lack of urgency’ led to ‘inexcusable’ delays

“A combination of incompetence and over-optimism at the heart of government” meant that warnings from China were “dismissed for weeks”, said Eleanor Hayward and Oliver Wright in The Times.

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Inaction and palpable “scepticism” turned February 2020 into “a lost month”, said inquiry chair Heather Hallett. Covid cases were soaring but the Cabinet did not meet during the half-term break and Johnson did not chair a single meeting of the Cobra emergency committee.

Scientific models suggest that a nationwide lockdown on 16 March “would have halved the number of deaths in the first wave” but, by the time a lockdown was even considered, a week later, it “was already too late”. It was a difficult decision but the delays were still “inexcusable” – particularly when the same mistake was made before the second lockdown in November.

Downing Street culture was ‘toxic and chaotic’

Johnson “reinforced” a “toxic and chaotic” environment at the centre of government, in which the views of colleagues, “particularly women, often went ignored, to the detriment of good decision-making”, Hallett said.

This spread further than the prime minister. His special adviser at the time, Dominic Cummings, “materially contributed” to the sexist workplace culture. One “particularly disgraceful” WhatsApp message – “we cannot keep dealing with this horrific meltdown of the British state while dodging stilettos from that c***” – was symptomatic of his “offensive, sexualised and misogynistic language”.

Devolved nations ‘overly reliant’ on Westminster

The devolved governments of Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland had to make “unenviable choices”, the report said. But they “failed to engage with the threat” and were “overly reliant” on Westminster to lead the response. A “lack of trust” between Johnson and the administrations’ First Ministers “coloured the approach to decision-making throughout the pandemic”.

None of the national cabinets acted with “sufficient speed” in the emerging crisis. The first case in Wales, for example, was identified on 28 February but, on 4 March, First Minister Mark Drakeford “chose to attend St David’s Day celebrations in Brussels rather than the Welsh Cabinet meeting”. In Northern Ireland and Scotland, “Covid-19 was only discussed under ‘any other business’ in meetings until as late as 24 and 25 February respectively”.

Partygate ‘undermined public confidence’

Rule-breaking and “Partygate” events resulted in public outcry. Then deputy cabinet secretary Helen MacNamara told the inquiry that she “would find it hard to pick one day when the regulations were followed properly inside” No. 10.

Officials and ministers breaking lockdown rules, and that rule-breaking not being swiftly addressed, “undermined public confidence in decision-making and significantly increased the risk of people not complying with the rules designed to protect them,” said Hallett.

Scientific advice ‘flawed’ and ‘bamboozled’ polticians

Under the heading “Flawed scientific advice”, the report notes that, until 14 and 15 March, Chris Whitty and Patrick Vallance “advised that restrictions should not be implemented until closer to the peak of infections”. They believed the public might tire of complying with restrictions if they were imposed too early and went on for too long.

However, “scientific advisers had not appreciated the likelihood of the NHS being overwhelmed before then”. At this point, there was a lack of adequate infection data, as well as hospital and health service data.

The inquiry heard that “many ministers lacked confidence in their ability to understand technical material”, said Jessica Murray in The Guardian, with Johnson in particular singled out for struggling with scientific concepts. Vallance’s notes from the time said Johnson was “bamboozled” and that watching him “get his head around the stats was awful”.

Hallett made 19 recommendations, adding to the 10 issued in the first report. More will follow in eight further reports, set to be published over the next two years.