The 3 U.S. negotiating errors that paved the way for the Taliban's return to power

Taliban flags.
(Image credit: KARIM SAHIB/AFP via Getty Images)

The Taliban didn't regain control of Afghanistan overnight, and while their return to power was years in the making, the Trump administration's agreement with the group last year helped speed up the process, Lisa Curtis, the director of the Indo-Pacific Security Program at the Center for a New American Security, writes for Foreign Affairs.

Curtis zeroed in on three errors the negotiation team, led by Zalmay Khalilzad, made out of "desperation to conclude a deal" and put an end to the decades-long U.S. military involvement in Afghanistan. The first, she writes, was believing the Taliban would eventually sit down with the Afghan government to hash out a long-term political settlement. This led Washington to exclude Kabul from their talks with the Taliban in Qatar, which Curtis argues "prematurely conferred legitimacy on the" insurgents.

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Tim O'Donnell

Tim is a staff writer at The Week and has contributed to Bedford and Bowery and The New York Transatlantic. He is a graduate of Occidental College and NYU's journalism school. Tim enjoys writing about baseball, Europe, and extinct megafauna. He lives in New York City.